유재하 "가리워진 길"

보일듯 말듯 가물거리는
안개속에 쌓인 길
잡힐 듯 말 듯 멀어져 가는
무지개와 같은 길
그 어디에서 날 기다리는지
둘러 보아도 찾을 수 없네

그대여 힘이 되주오
나에게 주어진 길
찾을 수 있도록
그대여 길을 터주오
가리워진 나의 길

이리로 가나 저리로 갈까
아득하기만 한데
이끌려 가듯 떠나는
이는 제 갈길을 찾았나
손을 흔들며 떠나 보낸 뒤
외로움만이 나를 감쌀 때

그대여 힘이 되주오
나에게 주어진 길 찾을 수 있도록
그대여 길을 터주오 가리워진 나의 길

언니네 이발관 "가장 보통의 존재"

언제 다시 들어도 느끼는 것이지만..이 곡은 정말 보통이 아니다.

***

관심을 애처로이 떠나보내고
내가 온 별에선 연락이 온지 너무 오래되었지
아무도 찾지 않고 어떤 일도 생기지 않을 것을 바라며
살아온 내가 어느날 속삭였지 나도 모르게

이런 이런 큰일이다 너를 마음에 둔게

당신을 애처로이 떠나보내고
그대의 별에선 연락이 온지 너무 오래되었지

너는 내가 흘린 만큼의 눈물
나는 니가 웃은 만큼의 웃음
무슨 서운하긴, 다 길 따라 가기 마련이지만
그래도 먼저 손 내밀어 주길 나는 바랬지

나에겐 넌 너무나 먼 길
너에게 난 스며든 빛
이곳에서 우린 연락도 없는 곳을 바라 보았지

이런 이런 큰일이다 너를 마음에 둔게

평범한 신분으로 여기 보내져
보통의 존재로 살아온 지도 이젠 오래되었지
그동안 길따라 다니며 만난 많은 사람들
다가와 내게 손 내밀어 주었지 나를 모른채

나에게 넌 허무한 별빛
너에게 난 잊혀진 길
이곳에서 우린 변하지 않을 것을 약속했었지

이런 이런 큰일이다 너를 마음에 둔게
이런 이런 큰일이다 나를 너에게 준게

나에게 넌 너무나 먼 길
너에게 난 스며든 빛
언제였나 너는 영원히 꿈속으로 떠나버렸지

나는 보통의 존재 어디에나 흔하지
당신의 기억 속에 남겨질 수 없었지
가장 보통의 존재 별로 쓸모는 없지
나를 부르는 소리 들려오지 않았지

Why does Bacon claim that a “new logic” is necessary?

Bacon, Novum Organum

By definition, Bacon’s instauration demands two simultaneous processes: restoration and institution. He seeks to restore hope, which has been lost in Aristotle’s organon, and establish a new logic derived from the rules of experiment. In other words, a fresh start is necessary, for the old logic has fallen into the vanity of superinduction and the despair of impossible progress. Bacon’s new logic empowers the mind to “exercise its rightful authority over the nature of things” (7). Bacon desires the “victory of art over Nature” (120), which will produce the beneficial effect to the mankind. This is his Novum Organum, the new science.

In fact, Bacon’s new logic first builds upon the recognition of our imperfect understanding. Men should not attempt to go beyond what they cannot know. Only the “right and proper humility of the human spirit” (13) can lead men to a proper employment of scientific methods. An attempt to overreach or overestimate can produce nothing but a contemptible error. For this reason, Bacon devises the new logic, which “confines the sense within its proper sphere” (15), and gradually leads men to particulars. In this method, the maximum minimization of the accidental outcomes is attained.

Such is the Baconian experiment that generates definite rules and axioms. The notion of experiment as the “well-weighed experience” allows “the new light of axioms to be derived from the particulars by a certain course and rule, which in turn will point to new particulars” (110).  This experimental method is different from that of the empiricist, because the latter merely extract works from works, and experiments from experiments. Bacon’s road freely rises and falls, “first ascending to axioms, then descending to works” (ibid), which, in turn, makes it a “legitimate interpreter of Nature” (119). Moreover, it is also superior to rationalist philosophy, which fails to inquire into the causes of the most familiar things. Bacon’s new logic gives attention not only to the frequently occurring things, but also to the base and sordid details. Only in such attempt to find the light and information in every common thing lies a hope for ever-improving knowledge.

In general, these sets of well-established rules constitute Bacon’s most significant invention: the method of induction. Bacon claims this new induction method to be the proper means for the discovery and contrasts it with Aristotelian syllogism, which relies on premises that are much susceptible to false definitions and abstractions. Moreover, he strongly attacks the syllogism for its separation from the practical and efficient cause. Bacon explicitly claims that the modern science must focus on the physical causes, which investigate the moving principles, not the static. Correspondingly, he asserts that the new logic must look at the beginning in which the ends are not built-in. Otherwise, it cannot manipulate the Nature by the power of knowledge; it adds nothing to “the welfare of mankind.”

Moreover, as a true scientific method, the induction “analyzes Nature by proper rejections and exclusions” (111). Bacon considers this reduction rule to be necessary, for it compels us to be content with the true and solid intermediate axioms. In fact, the old logic fell to the falsity because it presumptuously attempted to draw universal principles straight from the particulars. Bacon argues that the correct way to arrive at the most general axiom is to follow the gradual and continuous ascent from the senses. Only in this way are the universal rules “not abstract but are really limited by the intermediate ones” (ibid). After all, “everything of practically utility depends on things intermediate” (75).

Finally, it is through the induction and exclusion method that Bacon succeeds to escape idols and superstitious inquiries. Bacon’s new logic rightfully stands in the middle way, establishing a “true, lawful and lasting marriage between the empirical and the rational faculties” (14). Just like the bee, the novum organum “gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and field, then transforms and digests it by a power of its own” (105). This is the modern science—that changes nature through the true course of an experiment. It is an active philosophy that will constantly “bring new works, divine wisdom and order” (79). The new logic is the knowledge and power.

Montaigne vs. Aristotle: Experience and Form

Montaigne, Essays

Montaigne’s philosophy at first seems highly troubling for it radically denigrates what is often considered as the most divine attribute in man: reason. In fact, Montaigne claims that perfect rationality is neither possible nor desirable for a common man. In a sense, his Essays is the collection of his personal trials that undermine the traditional Aristotelian conception of the perfect form. Instead of stressing the ideal, he bares what is real—a common, weak, and imperfect man, i.e. himself. In the end, Montaigne claims that a reason must be submitted to experience, the most ‘perfect’ quality of man. For Montaigne, the knowledge of oneself—and one’s ignorance—is the divine, and it is only through the experience by which he comes to know himself.

Whereas for Aristotle the experience is merely the first step on a way to metaphysics, it is the ends in itself for Montaigne. Experience can never occupy the higher ladder in Aristotle’s philosophy because it does not know the why. Only metaphysics can completely fulfill the natural desire of knowledge. On the contrary, Montaigne says, “…of our sciences, those seem to me most terrestrial and low which have risen the highest” (856). He does not seek the universal or the final cause.

Accordingly, his invention of the “new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher,” in rejection of the Aristotelian form, is not at all surprising. His ‘figure,’ based on the irrational and private individual, forms a direct opposite to Aristotle’s concept of the great soul. For Aristotle, the ultimate virtue lies in the political space. The moral virtue can only occur in public space, where shameful realm of the domestic and private never enters. Anything of the perfect form is complete, and, therefore, unsusceptible to trials. Yet, Montaigne associates such form with the defect, precisely because of its impassivity to judgments. Therefore, he replaces ‘greatness of soul’ with the ‘openness of mind,’ and sets the latter as the true virtue. For Montaigne, impossibility of assaying means vice. He denies the existence of the one and universal form, since the things are more dissimilar than similar. Difference and diversity that reveals both true and false is truer than the form that gives the true only. Even when one attempts to secure rationality and correct ‘the unruliness of thought,’ clinging to the impossible notion of the form achieves nothing; it is the knowledge of both the good and evil, earned from everyday experience, which produces the real effect.

In fact, Montaigne’s emphasis on the familiar and ordinary reappears in his discussion of the common man versus the philosopher. Again, he attacks Aristotle’s belief that perfection—of reason or morality—is only found in philosopher. In fact, Montaigne not even attempts to distinguish the ‘man’ and the ‘philosopher.’ He believes “each man bears the entire form of man’s estate” (611), i.e., every man is complete in what he is. This notion, then, inevitably leads Montaigne to redefine philosophy as that of the active doing—the judgment. He focuses on ‘the common’ to avoid arrogant presumption, “the first foundation of the tyranny of the evil spirit” (328). Montaigne rearranges philosophy so that it escapes passivity and becomes the doing itself. For him, philosophy is not a mere contemplation but an active essai-ing. Understanding of the reason is never alone sufficient. An effectual philosophy must also be based on the active judgment of experiences. Only then can man become the master of nature and produce an effect for the common good.

Finally, in this Montaigne’s lowering of the aim of philosophy, from knowing the complete being to learning how to enjoy our being, one finds “an absolute perfection and virtually divine” (856). Anything divine never comes from outside of ourselves; it must be found within. After all, the “sociable wisdom,” Montaigne’s ultimate philosophical goal, arises from the lives, which “conform to the common human patter, with the order, but without miracle and without eccentricity” (857).

Bach "Chaconne in D minor"

Nathan Milstein

Jascha Heifetz